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a b s t r a c t
The provision of content confidentiality via message encryption is by no means sufficient
when facing the significant privacy risks present in online communications. Indeed, the
privacy literature abounds with examples of traffic analysis techniques aimed to reveal a
great deal of information, merely from the knowledge, even if probabilistic, of who is com-
municating with whom, when, and how frequently. Anonymous-communication systems
emerge as a response against such traffic analysis threats. Mixes, and in particular thresh-
old pool mixes, are a building block of anonymous communications systems. These are
nodes that receive, store, reorder and delay messages in batches. However, the anonymity
gained from the statistical difficulty to link incoming and outgoing messages comes at the
expense of introducing a potentially costly delay in the delivery of those messages.
In this paper we address the design of such mixes in a systematic fashion, by defining
quantitative measures of both anonymity and delay, and by mathematically formalizing
practical design decisions as a multiobjective optimization problem. Our extensive theoret-
ical analysis finds the optimal mix parametrization and characterizes the optimal trade-off
between the contrasting aspects of anonymity and delay, for two information-theoretic
measures of anonymity. Experimental results show that mix optimization may lead to sub-
stantial delay reductions for a desirable level of anonymity.
! 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades, the Internet and the Web have
enabled new forms of communication such as e-mail,
instant messaging and social networking that have become
essential to modern life. The so-called network of networks
[2] not only has become an essential communication
channel but also has transformed people’s habits – online
shopping, electronic voting and streaming media are just
other examples of services and applications built upon this
network.
Despite the myriad of benefits that the Internet has
brought to users, it has also laid stress on the need for pri-
vacy protection. One of the reasons behind this is that the
Internet, as many other data communication networks,
requires that every user be identified by a unique address,
in order for messages to be routed through the network.
Internet service providers (ISPs) are precisely in charge of
allocating addresses to users and keeping the correspon-
dence between user identifiers and addresses. In this man-
ner, users wishing to communicate through the Internet
just need to attach the source and destination addresses
to the message to be sent. On the one hand, these
addresses enable the intermediary entities (switches,
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routers, firewalls) involved in the communication process
to forward these messages until the destination address
is reached. But on the other hand, since the addresses are
transmitted in clear, these entities themselves, or any
adversary capable of intercepting, or simply listening to
communications, may ascertain who is communicating
with whom. In other words, the inherent operation of this
network poses serious privacy concerns. Imagine, for
example, a user who browses a Web forum on pregnancy
tips from the office, during her lunch break. Even if the
Web server is trustworthy and the contents of the informa-
tion exchanged are encrypted, a privacy adversary, perhaps
a human resources manager at her company, might still
capture and inspect the packet headers to infer sensitive
interests of the user, and take discriminative action against
her possible promotion.
Clearly, the use of encryption techniques is not enough
to mitigate these privacy risks. Concealing the content of
messages hinders adversaries in their efforts to learn the
information that users exchange, but does not prevent
those adversaries from unveiling who is communicating
with whom, when, or how frequently. Motivated by this,
privacy-enhancing technologies referred to as anony-
mous-communication systems (ACSs) have emerged [18].
The first proposal of an ACS was the mix proposed by
Chaum in 1981 to provide anonymous email services [8].
Since then, many other ACSs have been proposed. Some
of these are variations of Chaum’s mix design, meant to
be used for message-based applications with toleration to
latency, such as email [10,39,54,13,26,19], while others
focus on providing bidirectional anonymous channels for
applications with low-latency requirements, such as web
browsing [52,33,51,27].
This article focuses on message-based high-latency
ACSs. The goal of these systems is to prevent an adversary
from linking an outgoing message to its corresponding
input message. To achieve this, mix-based systems delay
and reorder messages, in addition to modifying crypto-
graphically their contents, so that inputs and outputs can-
not be correlated on the basis of content or timing, as
represented in Fig. 1. A popular family of mix types is
known as threshold pool mixes [24]. These mixes collect a
number of incoming messages, store them in an internal
memory, and output a fraction of them once the number
of collected messages kept reaches a certain threshold.
Certainly, delaying messages negatively affects the
usability of these systems and hence imposes a cost on
them. Yet, higher delays provide users with a higher degree
of message unlinkability. Thus, mix systems pose an inher-
ent trade-off between anonymity and delay. This compro-
mise between anonymity and delay has not been studied
in the anonymous communication literature in a mathe-
matical, formal fashion. Given a maximum expected delay
that users are willing to tolerate, there are no methods to
optimize the mix parameters such that anonymity is max-
imized while respecting delay constraints. Similarly, given
anonymity requirements, there are no methods that can
assist mix designers in selecting parameters that meet
those requirements while minimizing the expected mes-
sage delay.
1.1. Contribution and organization
We have motivated the necessity of ACSs to mitigate
the privacy risks derived from online traffic analysis. Con-
cordantly, the object of this work is to address the problem
of designing threshold pool mixes, a key building block in
the area of anonymous communications, in a manner that
contemplates the optimal trade-off between two contrast-
ing aspects: anonymity and delay. The first aspect, the ano-
nymity of the peers involved in the communication, gained
through the statistical difficulty to link incoming and out-
going messages, is something we would like to maximize.
The second aspect, which we wish to minimize, is the
potentially costly delay experienced by the messages sent
through the mix. Thus we are faced with the inescapable
compromise of maximizing anonymity for a given tolera-
ble delay, or minimizing delay for a desired level of
anonymity.
We approach the issue in a systematic fashion, drawing
upon the methodology of multiobjective optimization,
long established in scientific fields such as data compres-
sion or economics, but perhaps less so in the area of infor-
mation privacy. More precisely, we consider a standard
adversary model (global passive adversary) and adopt sev-
eral quantifiable measures of anonymity in the literature,
Hartley’s, Shannon’s, collision, min-and, in general, Rényi’s
entropies. We then proceed to mathematically formalize
practical decisions in the design of threshold pool mixes
in terms of a multiobjective optimization problem. Our
extensive theoretical analysis finds the optimal mix
parametrization and characterizes the optimal trade-off
between the aspects of anonymity and delay, for the infor-
mation-theoretic measures of anonymity adopted. Our
results show that mix optimization may lead to substantial
delay reductions for a given level of anonymity.
It must be pointed out that the choice of anonymity
metrics in the formulation of our model is driven by our
own recent work on the measurement of privacy [50]. In
the cited work, we aim to offer a unified perspective on a
number of privacy metrics, under their conceptual connec-
tion with the stochastic notion of an adversary’s estimation
error in ascertaining confidential information, modeled as
a random event, or the adversary’s effort in removing any
residual uncertainty. For the sake of readability and
Fig. 1. Many ACSs are built upon the idea of Chaum’s mix. Essentially, a
mix can be seen as a black box that forwards messages in such a way that
prevents an adversary from linking an outgoing message to its corre-
sponding input message.
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self-containment, we provide here a short summary
(Section 3.3) on the interpretation of various types of
entropies as anonymity metrics, adapted from that work
for the specific context of the current paper.
Finally, it should be noted that our contribution on the
design of threshold pool mixes may be regarded from two
perspectives. First, as a step towards the design of such
mixes in keeping with the philosophy of usable privacy,
that is, practical privacy enhancing technology that realis-
tically takes into account the cost of its presence. Secondly,
as an illustration of the applicability of formalized multiob-
jective optimization techniques to the still emerging field
of privacy in information systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the state of art in ACSs and anonymity
metrics. After some mathematical preliminaries and a con-
cise exposition on the interpretation of various types of
entropies as an anonymity metrics, Section 3 presents a
formulation of the problem of optimizing the anonymity-
delay trade-off in threshold pool mixes. Section 4 investi-
gates this problem theoretically, while Section 5 illustrates
numerically the main results. Lastly, conclusions are drawn
in Section 6.
2. State of the art
In this section, we first provide a review of ACSs, then
overview some approaches related to the configuration of
network-management protocols, and finally describe the
most widely used anonymity metrics in the literature.
2.1. ACSs
ACSs for data communication networks can be classi-
fied into two main classes, namely, high-latency, message-
based systems and low-latency, connection-based systems.
The former systems provide users with strong anonymity
guarantees, but the application of such systems is
restricted to noninteractive services where users are will-
ing to tolerate delays that can range from seconds to hours.
For services like e-mail and electronic voting, such delays
may be acceptable and even expected. However, this might
not be the case for real-time, interactive applications like
instant messaging and Web browsing. Low-latency sys-
tems are precisely devised for this kind of applications.
They provide better performance but this is at the cost of
increased vulnerability towards a number of traffic analy-
sis attacks [61].
In this section, we first examine systems based on
variations of the original mix proposed by Chaum, and that
are intended for high-latency applications. These are the
ACSs to which the optimization methods proposed in this
article can be applied. For completeness, we also introduce
approaches that do not rely on the principles of mixes and
are designed for services with low-latency requirements.
2.1.1. High-latency ACSs
As described in Section 1, mixes delay and reorder mes-
sages to preserve the unlinkability [46] of incoming and
outgoing messages. The ultimate purpose is to protect
the anonymity of users exchanging messages, or in other
words, to conceal who talks to whom. The idea behind
Chaum’s mix is conceptually simple. Users wishing to
anonymously send messages to other peers encrypt these
messages with the public key of the mix. The mix collects
a number of these encrypted messages and stores them in
its internal memory. When the number of collected mes-
sages reaches a certain threshold, the messages are
decrypted, the information about senders is removed,
and the mix forwards all the messages to their recipients
in a random order.
In the literature, this process of collecting, storing and
forwarding messages when a condition is satisfied is nor-
mally referred to as a round. An important group of mixes
called pool mixes operate on this basis. Depending on the
flushing condition, we may distinguish different types of
pool mixes [24]. In threshold pool mixes, similarly to
Chaum’smixes, the flushing condition depends on the num-
ber ofmessages stored. Themix accumulatesmessages until
a certain threshold number (a parameter of the mix) is
reached. At that point the mix selects a fraction (also a
parameter) of the availablemessages to send to their respec-
tive recipients, while keeping the rest of the messages in its
internal memory for the next round [26]. This strategy
increases the level of anonymity as the set of possible
incoming messages linkable to an outgoing target message
includes all those messages that entered the mix before
the targetmessagewas flushed. On the downside, incoming
messages may be stored in the mix for an arbitrarily long
period of time, which degrades the usability of the system.
Timed mixes on the other hand flush messages periodi-
cally [60]. Plain timed mixes forward all messages kept in
the memory every fixed time interval, called timeout, inde-
pendently of how many messages they have received in
that interval. The main advantage of these mixes is that
the delay experienced by messages is bounded, in contrast
to the case of threshold pool mixes. The flip side is that the
unlinkability between incoming and outgoing messages
may be seriously compromised in situations of low traffic.
Mixmaster [10,44], a deployed anonymous email net-
work based on pool mixes, implements a combination of
both threshold and time flushing conditions. Mixmaster
flushes messages periodically when its timeout expires,
but only if a number of messages greater than a threshold
has been received. Mixmaster further implements a
dynamic pool, meaning that the fraction of messages
flushed in a round is dependent on the number of mes-
sages contained – this fraction grows with the number of
messages stored [26].
An alternative to pool mixes are the mixes based on the
concept of stop-and-go, known as continuous mixes [39].
This approach abandons the idea of rounds, and instead
delays each message individually, for an amount of time
that is specified by the sender (randomly chosen according
to an exponential distribution). The delay information is
attached to the message, which is in turn encrypted with
the mix’s public key and then sent to the mix. The mix
decrypts the message and keeps it for the time specified
by the user before forwarding it to its recipient. Danezis
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proved that the exponential distribution optimizes the
tradeoff between anonymity and mean delay in continuous
mixes [16]. Continuous mixes were also implemented
(with some modifications) with the name ‘Reliable’ as part
of the Mixmaster network, where they interoperated with
the Mixmaster pool mixes. Several vulnerabilities of the
deployed ‘Reliable’ were pointed out by Diaz et al., who
also showed that they did not guarantee any minimum
level of anonymity in practice given low traffic levels [25].
High-latency mixes are hardened towards passive traf-
fic analysis. However, long-term, persistent communica-
tion patterns may eventually be inferred by combining
the input–output observations of a large number of rounds
[15]. Variants of this attack have been shown to be applica-
ble specifically to pool mixes, given certain (strong)
assumptions on static user behavior [21]. Recent results
that extend disclosure attacks to consider dynamic behav-
ior by users in their sending patterns have been effective in
timed mix networks, but no results are available consider-
ing threshold pool mixes [22].
Active attacks on high-latency mixes, carried by adver-
saries with the ability to insert, remove and delay mes-
sages, have also been shown effective. Specific attacks of
this sort include blending attacks [59], in which the adver-
sary ensures, by means of delaying (honest) messages and
generating (malicious) messages, that a target message can
be fully traceable when routed through the mix. A counter-
measure that mitigates, to some extent, this attack, con-
sists of randomizing both the strategies for mixing and
generating dummy traffic [26]. Additional countermea-
sures to detect active attacks also rely on the use of
dummy traffic. The key idea in RGB mixes [20] is to gener-
ate heartbeat dummy traffic to detect (and potentially
react) if the network is under attack by an active adversary
that removes or delays messages.
High-latency ACSs consist of networks of mixes, such
that every message traverses multiple mixes before being
delivered to its end destination. The main reason to route
over multiple mixes is to limit the trust that is placed on
each individual mix. In order to trace a message, the adver-
sary would need to compromise all the mixes along its
path. Prior work has proposed various network topologies,
including cascades [8], free-route networks [54], and
restricted-route networks [13]. Böhme et al. discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of cascades and free route
networks considering different sets of assumptions and
adversarial models [4].
2.1.2. Low-latency ACSs
Low-latency ACSs differ from high-latency ACSs in two
key aspects. First, low-latency ACSs establish a bi-direc-
tional circuit between the initiator and responder of the
communication, rather than just delivering isolated mes-
sages from senders to receivers. Second, low-latency rou-
ters do not delay traffic. Given these two characteristics,
low-latency ACSs are suited for interactive applications
with tight latency constraints such as anonymous web
browsing, which cannot be implemented with pool mixes.
The most prominent low-latency ACSs are based on
onion routing [33,51]. In these systems users establish cir-
cuits that pass through multiple onion routers. Packets
being sent through those circuits are encrypted in a lay-
ered (onion) fashion, so that each of the routers peels (in
the upstream direction), or adds (in the downstream direc-
tion) a layer of encryption. The second-generation version
of onion routing, Tor [27], is, with more than half a million
daily users, the most widely used ACS.
Another example of low-latency system is Crowds,
which provides anonymity towards websites for users
browsing the Web [52]. Crowds contemplates that a group
of users wanting to anonymously browse the Web will col-
laborate to submit their requests, by forming a ‘‘crowd’’. A
user who decides to send a request to a Web server, selects
first a member of the crowd at random and then forwards
the request to that member. When this member receives
the request, it flips a biased coin to determine whether to
further send the request to another member or to submit
it to the Web server. This process is repeated until the
request is finally relayed to its destination. As a result,
the Web server, as well as crowd members forwarding
the request, cannot ascertain the identity of the true sen-
der, that is, the member who initiated the request. Path
lengths in Crowds follow a geometric distribution, which
has been proven optimal in terms of anonymity for a given
mean latency [17].
The increased performance of low-latency ACSs comes
at the cost of vulnerabilities towards global passive adver-
saries. Adversaries who can monitor both the entries and
exits of the ACS are able to correlate traffic patterns on dif-
ferent connections, and thus find the correspondence
between the initiators and respondents of communications.
This is investigated in [78], where the authors consider an
adversary who strives to ascertain such correspondence
by using two correlation techniques, namely time-domain
methods and frequency-domain methods. For the former
methods, the authors propose quantifying traffic similarity
by using the mutual information. For the latter methods,
they resort to matched filters [72] to detect the presence
of the input traffic in an output link.
Another study of timing attacks on low-latency mixed-
based systems is [40]. The authors assume the same adver-
sary model considered above, where the attacker controls
the first and the last mix of a path. Under this assumption,
they propose a framework for investigating a range of anal-
ysis techniques and countermeasures. In particular, the
authors experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of cover
traffic, that is, the insertion of dummy messages to conceal
timing information. In addition, they suggest a variation of
this technique, defensive dropping, which is intended for
constant-rate traffic. In essence, the idea is that users gen-
erate cover traffic that will be dropped afterwards at inter-
mediate mixes.
In the special case of wireless networks [31], studies the
resilience of several flow-based mix networks to flow
marking attacks. In this type of attacks, an adversary gener-
ates electromagnetic interferences with the aim of embed-
ding periodic marks into input traffic flows. When
adopting this strategy, the attacker is able to unveil, to a
certain extent, the relationship between incoming and out-
going flows. Empirical results for traditional mix systems
indicate that an adversary may unveil this relationship
with high probability.
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Finally, we would like to mention another study [74]
that evaluates many of the low-latency systems reviewed
in this subsection. Specifically, said study investigates the
degradation of the level of anonymity provided by the
Crowds and onion-routing protocols when there is a per-
sistent connection between the sender of a message and
the receiver.
2.2. Network-management communications
In the previous subsection we examined the main ACSs
and some of the attacks they are vulnerable to. In this sub-
section, we describe one of the vulnerabilities of the inter-
domain routing protocol of the Internet, the border gateway
protocol (BGP) [53], and briefly review some approaches
that, like ours, attempt to optimize the design parameters
of network communications to improve security.
The BGP is a protocol that enables the exchange of rout-
ing and reachability information among the set of adminis-
trative domains, also known as autonomous systems (ASs),
the Internet is composed of. Examples of ASs include cor-
porate networks and ISPs. Each of these domains consists
of a network of routers which, leveraging on the informa-
tion provided by routing protocols, direct traffic through-
out the Internet. When a user wishes, for example, to
send an e-mail to another user belonging to a different
ISP, both ISPs and others ASs communicate through BGP
routers to learn about which is the best path for the data
to reach the destination IP address. In particular, routers
check certain routing tables built from announcements
issued by ASs. In these announcements, ASs basically spec-
ify the set of IP addresses to which they route traffic.
The problem with BGP is that the operation of this pro-
tocol relies entirely on trust. That is, the protocol assumes
that routers within an AS will behave honestly when
announcing the best path to achieve a given destination.
This vulnerability has been identified as the Internet’s big-
gest security hole [76], as it opens the possibility to surrep-
titiously wiretap Internet traffic on a large scale.
Although numerous alternatives have been proposed to
address the security of BGP, none of them have gained
wide adoption yet. As pointed out by Butler et al. [6], this
is mainly due to the difficulty in finding an admissible bal-
ance among deployability, storage costs and security. For
example, the secure border gateway protocol (S-BGP)
[38] makes use of public key encryption to authenticate
route announcements, but the computational costs it
incurs are seen as prohibitive. Motivated by this, a great
deal of research has investigated how to optimize such
costs [36,34,1].
A quite recent work [73] in this line has proposed a
routing control platform that does not require cooperation
among domains. The platform in question allows an ISP to
strike a balance among a set of criteria such as stability,
security and performance, when deciding the route for a
given message. More concretely, the route selection prob-
lem is modeled as a multiobjective optimization problem,
which ensures that the network administrator has the flex-
ibility to make arbitrary trade-offs among those criteria.
The authors argue that more flexible control over inter-
domain routing objectives may provide significant benefits
to ISPs. Among those benefits, the proposed approach may
avoid prefix hijacking, which means that the prefix of a
destination address is announced by an AS that does not
own it.
Another more recent work [68] investigates the adop-
tion of BGP as the protocol that may facilitate the next gen-
eration of software defined networks [45]. The authors
argue that the BGP policies are not versatile enough and
require continuous configuration. To cope with this, they
propose an architecture for decoupling routing from policy
control, which provides network operators with a flexible,
centralized policy configuration interface.
2.3. Anonymity metrics
This section assumes familiarity with certain types of
entropies, formally defined and briefly commentated later,
in the mathematical review of Section 3.2.
A great effort has been devoted in prior work to the
investigation of privacy metrics in general and anonymity
metrics in particular. Some of the best-known privacy met-
rics come from statistical disclosure control (SDC), a
research area that deals with the problem of disseminating
data about individuals without compromising their pri-
vacy. Among these metrics, the most popular is k-anonym-
ity, which was first proposed in [66,56]. Later, numerous
extensions and enhancements were introduced in an
attempt to address the limitations of this proposal. p-Sen-
sitive [71], l-diversity [42], t-closeness [41], an average ver-
sion of t-closeness [49], d-disclosure [5] and differential
privacy [28] are some of these approaches.
In the specific field of ACSs, many proposals focus on
measuring the extent to which these systems are effective.
A key point is that the degree of anonymity achieved
depends on the capabilities of the adversary, and often
anonymity metrics are tailored to the threat model
assumptions. A study of adversarial models for these sys-
tems can be found in [48].
One of the earliest proposals for assessing the degree of
anonymity provided by these systems appears in the
Crowds protocol [52], explained above. Concisely, the cited
work defines three anonymity requirements for each can-
didate initiator of a web request, in the form of probabilis-
tic events from the point of view of the adversary. The
strongest requirement, ‘‘beyond suspicion’’, is fulfilled
whenever all candidates are equally likely to be the initia-
tor of the request. Next in the list is the requirement of
‘‘probable innocence’’, demanding that the given user’s
likelihood be less than 1=2. The weakest requirement,
‘‘possible innocence’’, boils down to stipulating that this
likelihood simply not be 1. One of the main theoretical
results in that work states conditions under which the
intermediate requirement is satisfied for all crowd
members.
In the context of mix systems, Kesdogan et al. [39]
defined the anonymity set of users as the set of possible
senders of a given message, or recipients, in the sense that
the likelihood of them fulfilling the role in question is non-
zero. A simple measure of the anonymity set was proposed
by Berthold et al. [3], this measure is the logarithm of the
number of users involved in the communication, that is,
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the Hartley entropy of the anonymity set. The main draw-
back of this metric is that it does not contemplate the prob-
abilistic information that an adversary may obtain about
users when observing the system. In other words, this
approach ignores the fact that certain users may be more
likely to be the senders of a particular message. Pfitzmann
and Hansen later defined anonymity as the state of being
not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set
[47], introducing probabilistic concepts in the definition.
Several approaches have considered the use of informa-
tion-theoretic quantities to evaluate ACSs. The most com-
monly used are those proposed in [23,58], in which the
degree of anonymity observable by an adversary is mea-
sured essentially as the Shannon entropy of the probability
distribution of possible senders of a given message. Simi-
larly to these works, [35] suggests quantifying the ano-
nymity of a mix network as the Shannon entropy of the
true sender of a message, conditioned on the observations
of some compromised nodes. The use of entropy as a mea-
sure of privacy, however, is by no means new. As a matter
of fact, Shannon’s work in the fifties introduced the con-
cept of equivocation as the conditional entropy of a private
message given an observed cryptogram [62], later used in
the formulation of the problem of the wiretap channel
[75,12] as a measure of confidentiality.
Still in the case of information-theoretic measures, [65]
formalizes the notion of unlinkability by using Shannon’s
entropy.
On the other hand, [70,69], argue that a worst-case met-
ric should be considered instead of Shannon’s entropy,
since the latter contemplates an average case. The authors
refer to this worst-case metric as local anonymity, essen-
tially equivalent to min-entropy, and concordantly define
the source hiding property as the requirement that no sen-
der probability exceed a given threshold. Another approach
[63] proposes amethod for quantifying the property of rela-
tionship anonymity, as defined in [46]. More specifically, the
authors make use of Shannon’s entropy and min-entropy
for measuring this property. Similarly, [9] evaluates Shan-
non’s entropy, min-entropy and Hartley’s entropy as ano-
nymity metrics, and proposes then to use Rényi’s entropy,
which may be regarded as a generalization of those three
metrics.
Alternative methods include possibilistic – instead of
probabilistic – approaches, such as those suggested in
[67,43,30]. According to these metrics, subjects are consid-
ered anonymous if an adversary cannot link them to their
actions with absolute certainty. Further, [29] proposes a
combinatorial anonymity metric that counts the number
of possible one-to-one correspondences between a sent of
senders and a set of receivers, by means of the permanent
of the matrix of adjacencies of the associated bipartite
graph, consistent with message timing observations ruling
out some of the permutations. It must be stressed that
probability distributions weighting such possibilities are
not considered, or from a mathematically equivalent per-
spective, that those probabilities are considered equally
likely. Another difference with respect to most metrics
based on probabilities is that this metric is directly defined
on a group of consistent matchings between senders and
receivers, rather than defined on the set of senders or
receivers corresponding to one given message. Some limi-
tations and extensions of this approach may be found in
[32].
For the purposes of this paper, we may effectively con-
clude that in the scenario of ACSs, the anonymity measures
may be classified essentially into two groups, namely prob-
abilistic and possibilistic metrics. In the latter group we
include any metrics that do not probabilistically weight
possibilities, even if they resort to sophisticated combina-
torial methods. While most information-theoretic quanti-
ties are probabilistic, including Shannon’s entropy and
min-entropy, Hartley’s entropy is clearly possibilistic.
Because Hartley’s entropy is the logarithm of the anonym-
ity set size, both metrics are fundamentally the same.
Rényi’s entropies encompass these three entropies, and
except for the singular case of Hartley’s, constitute a para-
metric family of probabilistic measures. The concepts of
probable innocence in Crowds, local anonymity and source
hiding, are essentially equivalent to min-entropy, as they
all involve the most likely sender of a message. This preli-
minary classification is represented in Fig. 2.
Acknowledging the general relevance of information-
theoretic concepts in the privacy literature, and particu-
larly inspired by our own work on the specific subject of
privacy metrics [50], whose relation to the present paper
was explained in Section 1.1, we shall contemplate here
Shannon’s entropy and min-entropy as anonymity metrics.
3. Formal problem statement
This section is devoted to the description of our adver-
sarial model, and the mathematical formulation of the
problem of optimizing the anonymity-delay trade-off of a
threshold pool mix. Our formulation is prefaced by a quick,
statistical and information-theoretic background, in which
we revise the definition of Shannon’s entropy and min-
entropy, and by a succinct interpretation of these type of
entropies, adapted from our own work [50] on the specific
subject of privacy metrics, to the present context of ACSs.
The solution of the problem formulated is the object of
the next section.
3.1. Adversarial model
We adhere to an adversarial model commonly adopted
in the literature of anonymous communication reviewed
in Section 2. The specification of our adversary model is
detailed enough for the purposes of the scope of the paper,
but further technicalities on the topic may be found in the
citations included in our state-of-the-art section. In our
model, we assume that a privacy adversary, unable to com-
promise the threshold pool mix itself, but able to analyze
its input and output traffic, wishes to ascertain the corre-
spondence between its input and output messages, to ulti-
mately unveil who is communicating with whom.
Messages are not only forwarded in batches, but also
encrypted as well as padded to a constant size, in order
to hinder such adversaries in their efforts to establish mes-
sage correspondence based on timing, content or size com-
parisons. However, the adversary is assumed to know the
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principles of operation of the mix, and to be capable of
deducing the probabilities of input and output message
correspondence.
Henceforth, the term message will be used to refer to a
network-layer message. Later on in Section 4.4, we shall
tackle the issue when an application-layer message is bro-
ken into several network-layer messages, thus generating a
burst of messages with a common sender at the input of
the mix.
3.2. Notation and mathematical preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we shall follow the convention of
using uppercase letters for random variables (r.v.’s), and
lowercase letters for particular values they take on,
assumed to belong to a discrete alphabet. Probability mass
functions (PMFs) and probability density functions (PDFs)
are denoted by p and subindexed by the corresponding
r.v., or by an index on the alphabet. The expectation and
the variance operators are denoted by E and Var, respec-
tively. We occasionally prefer to denote the expectation
and the variance of an r.v. X more compactly as lX and
r2X . Expectations can model the special case of (weighted)
averages over a countable set of data points fxig1i¼1, simply
by defining an r.v. X distributed over this set according to a
PMF pXðxiÞ ¼ pi, so that EX ¼
P1
i¼1pi xi.
Recall [11] that the Shannon entropy H1ðXÞ of an r.v. X
with PMF pX is defined as
H1ðXÞ ¼ $E logpXðXÞ ¼ $
X1
i¼1
pi log pi;
in terms of the above example of discrete alphabet, under
the convention that 0 log 0 ¼ 0. Recall also that this
entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of the outcome
of a random variable distributed according to such PMF.
All theoretical results expressed in terms of logarithms
are valid for any base, but the customary basis of 2 is cho-
sen in all numerical computations, and concordantly
entropy units are bits. Shannon entropy belongs in fact to
a more general class of functionals known as Rényi entro-
pies [55], all of which satisfy certain additivity axiom
regarding statistically independent r.v.’s. Precisely, the
Rényi entropy HaðXÞ of order a of the same discrete r.v.
X, with PMF pXðxiÞ ¼ pi as above, is defined for any real
0 < a– 1, as
HaðXÞ ¼ $ log
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
E½pXðXÞa$1&a$1
q
¼ 1
1$ a log
X1
i¼1
pai ;
definition that may be construed as the negative logarithm
of the (generalized) power mean of order a$ 1 of the PMF,
weighted by itself. The definition is commonly extended
for the extreme values of the order a ¼ 0;1;1, simply by
taking limits of the above expression. In this manner, Shan-
non entropy is obtained when a ¼ 1, hence subindex in the
notation H1ðXÞ introduced earlier. It can be shown that for
a given distribution, Rényi entropies are nonincreasing
with a, and that for each a, they are maximized, among
all distributions on f1; . . . ;ng, by the uniform distribution
pi ¼ 1=n for all i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, for which HaðXÞ ¼ logn.
The extreme case when a ¼1 yields a type of entropy
known as min-entropy. In the previous example with PMF
pi, denote pmax ¼maxi¼1;2;...pi. Min-entropy is equivalently
defined as
H1ðXÞ ¼ min
i¼1;2;...
$ log pi ¼ $ log pmax:
A third type of entropy of particular significance within
the Rényi family, mentioned in the state-of-the-art section
and obtained for a ¼ 0, is Hartley’s entropy, namely the log-
arithm of the cardinality of the alphabet (after removal
without loss of generality of values with zero probability),
that is, H0ðXÞ ¼ logn in our finite-alphabet example.
Finally, a ¼ 2 yields the collision entropy
Anonymity Metrics in
Anonymous-Communication Systems
Probabilistic Possibilistic
Rényi Entropies
Shannon Entropy Hartley Entropy
Anonymity Set Size
Min-Entropy
Probable Innocence Combinatorial
Information-Theoretic
Fig. 2. A preliminary classification of anonymity metrics in ACSs.
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H2ðXÞ ¼ $ log EpXðXÞ ¼ $ log
X1
i¼1
p2i ;
which may be seen as the probability that two indepen-
dent copies of X coincide.
For these special examples of entropy, the monotonicity
and maximization properties of Rényi entropies already
stated boil down to
H0ðXÞP H1ðXÞP H2ðXÞP H1ðXÞ; ð1Þ
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed on a
finite alphabet, i.e., if and only if pi ¼ 1=n for all i ¼ 1; . . . ;n.
Recall that commonly, message arrivals in communica-
tions systems are modeled by a Poisson process with rate k,
and equivalently interarrival times T are assumed to be
independent, identically distributed according to an expo-
nential distribution with parameter k and PDF
pTðtÞ ¼ k e$k t , and concordantly, lT ¼ 1=k ¼ rT . An r.v. D
is said to have an Erlang distribution when characterized
by a PDF of the form
pDðdÞ ¼
kk dk$1
ðk$ 1Þ! e
$k d;
equivalently interpreted as the sum of k independent
exponential r.v.’s with a common parameter k.
Our theoretical analysis will exploit well-known prop-
erties of geometric r.v.’s., which model for example the
number of tosses of a coin until the first head occurs. Rig-
orously, a discrete r.v. X geometrically distributed on
f1;2; . . .gwith parameter p, counts the number of indepen-
dent Bernouilli trials needed to obtain one success, which
occurs with probability p. Recall that pXðxÞ ¼ ð1$ pÞx$1 p;
EX ¼ 1=p; H1ðXÞ ¼ H1ðpÞ=p and H1ðXÞ ¼ p, where H1ðpÞ
denotes the Shannon entropy of a binary r.v. of parameter
p:
H1ðpÞ ¼ $p logp$ ð1$ pÞ logð1$ pÞ:
It is also common to define the alphabet starting with 0 in
lieu of 1; in that case, pX ¼ ð1$ pÞx p; EX ¼ 1=p$ 1 and
the entropies remain the same.
3.3. Entropies as anonymity metrics for pool mixes
In the state-of-the-art subsection on anonymity met-
rics, Section 2.3, we briefly introduced three measures of
uncertainty and information, namely Hartley’s, min- and
Shannon’s entropies, whose precise definition we recalled
among the mathematical preliminaries of Section 3.2.
Although we also introduced the concept of collision
entropy in Section 3.2, our interpretation focuses on the
three most representative and meaningful cases, Hartley’s,
min- and Shannon’s entropies.
These measures of uncertainty of a random event are
essentially scalar-valued functions of probability distribu-
tions across a set of possible outcomes. Their particular sig-
nificance and wide application in the fields of information
theory, statistics and engineering is unquestionable, but
they are in fact found in a larger variety of fields, including
for example demography and ecology, in the form of diver-
sity indexes. In the context of ACSs in general and pool
mixes in particular, the knowledge of the privacy adversary
may be modeled by a probability distribution on the possi-
ble senders of a given message, enabling the interpretation
of these measures under the conceptual perspective of an
adversary’s estimation error in ascertaining the outcome
of a random event, or effort in removing any residual
uncertainty. The following interpretations are based
mainly on [50] and adapted to the subject of this paper.
' First, Hartley’s entropy is a possibilistic metric, in the
sense that it disregards the likelihood of the values of
an r.v., whereas both Shannon’s entropy and min-
entropy are probabilistic. In principle, one could mea-
sure the attained degree of anonymity, merely by the
cardinality of the set of candidate senders, or equiva-
lently, by the logarithm of such cardinality. Loosely
speaking, Hartley’s entropy may be regarded as a best-
case metric from the point of view of users (worst for
adversaries), in the sense that it represents a privacy
adversary’s thorough effort in considering any and all
possibilities, regardless of their likelihood. In pool
mixes, however, the set of candidate output messages
for a given input may be infinite, rendering Hartley’s
entropy inappropriate.
' Secondly, min-entropy may be connected to the error in
maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation, where the
adversary simply guesses the most likely outcome.
More specifically, the maximum probability pmax of a
random event X, its min-entropy H1ðXÞ and the proba-
bility of error !MAP ¼ 1$ pmax in MAP estimation, are
bijectively related and thus essentially equivalent, via
the relationship
!MAP ¼ 1$ 2$H1ðXÞ:
This may be construed as a worst-case metric, in the sense
that users are only concerned with the most vulnerable
statistical link between senders and messages.1 Although
not specific to pool mixes, in our review of the state of the
art on anonymity metrics, Section 2.3, we mentioned the
requirement of probable innocence. Clearly, probable inno-
cence for all possible candidates of a given message is equiv-
alent to pmax < 1=2, in turn equivalent to !MAX > 1=2, and
finally equivalent to H1ðXÞ > 1 bit.
' Last but not least, a well-known interpretation of Shan-
non’s entropy refers to the game of 20 questions, in
which one player must guess what the other is thinking
through a series of yes/no questions, as quickly as pos-
sible. Informally, Shannon’s entropy is a lower bound on
– and often good approximation to the minimum of –
the average number of binary questions regarding the
1 In a broad overview on the information-theoretic measuring of the flow
of information [64], recalls the well-known interpretation of the condi-
tional Shannon entropy of certain information of interest after a statistically
related observation is available, akin to the Bayesian statistical concepts of
posterior and prior probabilities. Under this interpretation, conditional
entropy is understood as remaining uncertainty, reducing the initial
uncertainty prior to the aforementioned observation, naturally terming
the resulting difference as information leaked. The cited work discusses a
possible definition of conditional min-entropy as the negative logarithm of
the average across all observations of the posterior probability most
vulnerable to guess.
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nature of possible outcomes of an event, to determine
which one in fact has come to pass, intelligently exploit-
ing their known probabilities. Inspired by the above
interpretation of Shannon entropy as the effective
uncertainty within a set endowed with a probability
distribution [58], proposed it as a measure of anonym-
ity. This measure takes into account the underlying
probability distribution in its entirety, between the
extremes posed by the previous two, yielding a quantity
bounded according to (1). For this reason, one may
think of it as an average-case metric. An alternative
interpretation of Shannon’s entropy in the context of
privacy is offered in [50] on the basis of the asymptotic
equipartition property (AEP) and the concept of typical
set [11]. Precisely, for an adversary jointly estimating
sequences of uncertain outcomes, rather than individu-
ally guessing single occurrences, Shannon’s entropy is a
measure of the effective cardinality of the set of candi-
date sequences.
The above discussion illustrates the fact that in practice,
there is no single, be-all, end-all quantitative measure of
anonymity. Quite the contrary, in the design of any pri-
vacy-enhancing mechanism, an appropriate metric must
faithfully reflect the desired privacy criteria in the context
of a specific application. Part of the value of our contribu-
tion lies in the characterization of the anonymity attained
by threshold pool mixes by means of several cases of Rényi
entropies, and their corresponding optimization. Among
other interpretations, we construe min-entropy and Shan-
non entropy as worst- and min-case metrics, respectively,
in the rough sense that the former places emphasis on the
most critical message linkability while the latter focuses on
the average correspondence. This work shows that the
optimal choice of parameters determining the precise
mode of operation of the mix will be radically different
depending on the metric preferred. In other contexts but
in an entirely analogous manner, worst- and average-case
optimization problems reflect such diverse criteria with
mathematically appropriate objective functions, and con-
cordantly yield often radically different solutions.
3.4. Formulation of the threshold pool mix operation and
performance metrics
Consider a threshold pool mix in steady state, forwarding
batches of k messages at a time, with a buffer of nP k
messages, thus keeping at least m ¼ n$ kP 0 messages
at a given time. More precisely, the manner in which the
mix operates is the following. At some point, the mix con-
tains its minimum of m messages, and waits for k addi-
tional messages to come in, for a total of n ¼ mþ k. Once
this threshold n is reached, k messages are drawn ran-
domly, independently and uniformly among all stored
messages, regardless of the order in which they arrived,
and sent out simultaneously. This leaves the mix again at
its minimum m, and the process is repeated from that
point on. In the extreme case when m ¼ 0, that is, k ¼ n,
the threshold pool mix forwards all of its messages in
every batch, thus becoming a Chaumian mix. The trivial
event of the absence of a mix may be readily represented
by k ¼ 1 ¼ n.
Fig. 3 depicts a portion of the operation of a threshold
pool mix with k ¼ 2; n ¼ 5 and m ¼ 3, where an adversary
strives to link the target message labeled as 0 to one of the
outgoing messages. Note that our reference time is consid-
ered to be the arrival time of this target message. Accord-
ing to this, we assign the label 1 to the first message
arriving after this target message, and $1 to the last mes-
sage that arrived before it. The other messages are labeled
analogously, from $2 to 3. As depicted in this figure, after
forwarding several messages, the mix finally outputs the
target message. In this case, message 0, which we choose
as reference, is delayed one output batch and one message
within this batch, thus experiencing a delay of three mes-
sages. As a result of the modification of the flow of mes-
sages, an adversary merely observing input and output
timings cannot discern the destination of the targeted
incoming message with absolute certainty. This figure will
be used repeatedly in this section as a running example to
clarify and illustrate the introduction of a number of for-
malisms exploited in our theoretical analysis, presented
later in Section 4. Concordantly, the detailed explanation
of the figure at hand will be provided as we delve into
the remainder of the current section.
Define the r.v. D as the delay in number of messages
incurred by a message from its arrival in the mix until it
is flushed; zero whenever the message is forwarded imme-
diately, a positive integer otherwise. In the example of
Fig. 3, message 0 experiences a delay of D ¼ 3 messages,
as it is flushed when message 3 arrives. To be precise, in
any statistical analysis of D we shall assume that the mix
is steady state, and that the corresponding message is cho-
sen either uniformly at random within an input batch, or
deterministically from its output. This latter technicality
is necessary because of the cyclic nature of the mix. To
see this, take the simple case of k ¼ n ¼ 3. The sequence
of delays incurred for each of the input messages will be
periodic and deterministic, specifically . . . ;2;1;0;2;
1;0; . . .. If D is not defined for a deterministically given
input message, but for a message chosen uniformly at ran-
dom within the input batch, then D becomes uniformly
distributed, identically for all choices across all batches.
From the perspective of output messages, because mes-
sages are shuffled before they are flushed, this technicality
does not apply. Finally, because output shuffling is uni-
form, our definition for D from the perspective of uniformly
randomly chosen inputs and deterministic outputs is one
and the same. Under these convenient assumptions, the
probability distribution of D, whether referring to input
or output messages, will be identical for any other message
(albeit not necessarily statistically independent). We
would like to stress that D ¼ 0 represents the event accord-
ing to which we randomly choose an input message caus-
ing the mix to flush immediately upon its arrival, and to
select it as any of its outputs. From the perspective of a
given output message, D ¼ 0 indexes the input triggering
the corresponding batch.
Define the expected delay (in number of messages)
!d ¼ lD ¼ ED: ð2Þ
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Let the delay in time units be modeled by a real-valued r.v.
D, related to the discrete r.v. D via the message interarrival
times Ti of future input messages, also real-valued r.v.’s,
simply by
D ¼
XD
i¼1
Ti;
with D ¼ 0 whenever D ¼ 0. The following proposition
shows the existence of a simple proportionality relation-
ship between delay in number of messages and delay in
time units, owing to the fact that both quantities are mea-
sured as expectations.
Proposition 0 (Delay in Time Units vs. Messages). Reason-
ably, we shall assume that the interarrival times Ti and the
delay in messages D are pairwise statistically independent.
Suppose further that the interarrival times have a common
expectation ETi ¼ lT ¼ !t, a common variance Var Ti ¼ r2T ,
and that they are uncorrelated.
(i) Under those mild assumptions, the expected delay in
time units lD is proportional to the expected delay in
number of messages lD; precisely,
lD ¼ lTlD ¼ !t!d:
(ii) Similarly, the variance of the delay in time units r2D is a
linear combination of the variance and the expectation
of the delay in number of messages, according to
r2D ¼ r2TlD þ l2Tr2D:
Assuming further that message arrivals follow a Poisson pro-
cess with rate k ¼ 1=!t,
r2D ¼ !t2 lD þ r2D
" #
:
Proof. The proportionality of the expectations follows
from a simple application of iterated expectation:
ET ¼ EE½TjD& ¼ E
XD
i¼1
ETi
" #
¼ E½DlT & ¼ lDlT :
Fig. 3. Example of operation of a threshold pool mix. Messages are indexed in order of arrival, from $2 to 3. Message 0, which we choose as reference, is not
flushed out instantaneously. On the one hand, it arrives before the buffer threshold is reached. On the other, it must wait for the second upcoming flush. In
the end, message 0 is delayed until message 3 arrives, and accordingly, D ¼ 3; B ¼ 1 and I ¼ 1.
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The statement on the variances is a consequence of the
Pythagorean identity for nonlinear estimation, viewing
E½DjD& ¼ DlT
as the estimate of the unknown D given the observation D,
that is,
Var D ¼ Var E½DjD& þ E Var ½DjD&:
Observe that in the second term, because Ti are uncor-
related, the variance of the sum is the sum of variances,
and therefore,
Var½DjD& ¼
XD
i¼1
Var Ti ¼ Dr2T :
In the special case of Poisson arrivals, Ti are exponen-
tially distributed with parameter k¼1=!t, thus lT ¼
rT ¼!t. h
In part of Proposition 0(ii) above, and later in Proposi-
tion 2 in Section 4.1, we assume that message traffic con-
forms to a Poisson model. We should stress that the only
results that hinge on this assumption are by no means cen-
tral to our contribution, but merely detail the continuous-
time distribution of the delays incurred. In any case, it
must also be stressed that Poisson-based models were lar-
gely discredited in early studies of Internet traffic that
identified long-term statistical dependence. However, in
recent years, as the number of interconnected hosts, the
amount of data transmitted, and the speed of Internet links
have exponentially increased, current studies suggest that
network traffic can be well represented by the Poisson
model for subsecond time scales [37] or approximately
for large-scale traffic aggregation [7].
Before proceeding, we characterize D by breaking it
down into two components. It suffices to note that the
delay D in number of messages an incoming message expe-
riences until it is sent out, is completely determined by the
batch B of k messages it belongs to, and the index I within
that batch, which we both number starting from 0. For-
mally, B and I are r.v.’s defined as
B ¼ bD=kc
I ¼ D mod k
$
so that
D ¼ k Bþ I: ð3Þ
Clearly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between D
and the pair ðB; IÞ. We noticed in the example of Fig. 3 that
message 0 was delayed by D ¼ 3 messages. In fact, it is not
flushed in the immediately upcoming batch, when mes-
sage 1 arrives, batch which we would index with 0, but
in the following batch, when message 3 arrives, numbered
with B ¼ 1. Furthermore, because message 0 arrives pre-
cisely one message before the buffer is flush, indicated by
I ¼ 1. In other words, the reference message is delayed
one output batch and one message within this batch.
It is important to note at this point that for a given out-
put message, D, in addition to measuring delay, unequivo-
cally indexes the corresponding input. Consequently, the
statistical properties of this r.v. accurately portray the
uncertainty regarding the input message corresponding
to a given output. Take for instance message 0 at the out-
put of the mix in Fig. 3, flushed when message 3 arrives.
D ¼ 3 indicates that the matching input occurred three
messages ago, thus its knowledge would dissipate its
otherwise uncertain origin.
When an input message is given instead, D does not
completely remove the uncertainty among all possible cor-
responding outputs; it merely narrows it down to an out-
put batch. As a matter of fact, the value of the batch B
suffices to pinpoint the output batch. However, viewing I
as the index of the matching output within the batch, the
pair ðB; IÞ fully determines the operation of the mix on an
input message, and its corresponding output. In our run-
ning example, message 0 at the input of the mix is not for-
warded the first time the mix flushes, but in the second
batch, numbered by B ¼ 1 > 0. Index I ¼ 1 > 0 indicates
that the second among the two output messages in this
batch matches the given input, message 0. But we men-
tioned that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
D and the pair ðB; IÞ. Consequently, D characterizes the sta-
tistical uncertainty of message correspondence, regardless
of whether an input or an output message is given.
To sum up, the delay in number of messages D not only
indexes message correspondence, thereby characterizing
the anonymity in the communication, but also suffices to
characterize the delay in time units, at least for the pur-
pose of averages, up to a proportionality constant. Based
on the latter observation, we shall hereafter analyze delays
only in terms of number of messages, in lieu of time units.
Having adopted message delay as our candidate to mea-
sure the cost incurred by the use of such a mix, we now
turn to the matter of proposing adequate measures of the
privacy gained in doing so. In keeping with the anonymity
metrics adopted in the literature, explored in Section 2.3, in
this paper we shall consider two information-theoretic
quantities, namely Shannon’s entropy H1ðDÞ and min-
entropy H1ðDÞ, of the (identically distributed) message
correspondence index D. Both quantities are suitable,
widely common measures of the uncertainty in the index
of message correspondence D, in other words, measures
of the dispersion of the probability distribution of candi-
date output messages for a given input. A succinct review
and interpretation of both types of entropies was provided
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, along with an argument against
Hartley’s entropy for our particular purposes.
As a final consideration, it must be pointed out that the
Shannon entropy and the min-entropy of the r.v. D, effec-
tively a measure of uncertainty on the correspondence
between input and output messages, are by no means
the only ways to quantitatively characterize the anonymity
introduced by the pool. Concordantly with the principle
established in [50], privacy may be construed as the error
in the estimation of certain confidential information of
interest to the privacy adversary, from any disclosed obser-
vation. In the context of our work, the sensitive informa-
tion to conceal is the correspondence between the sender
and receiver of a message. The observation consists in
the timing of the messages entering and exiting the pool
mix. Naturally, the algorithmic operation of the mix is
considered known to the attacker. Within this general
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principle, the choice of a specific privacy metric remains
entirely contingent upon the application and the adversar-
ial model at hand. This is of course in addition to mathe-
matical tractability, in the event that said metric is
meant to be part of a theoretical model aiming to asses
or improve the design of the anonymous-communication
mechanism.
Our characterization of message unlinkability by means
of the uncertainty between input and output messages is
directly inspired by the extensive literature on the subject,
particularly the work by Serjantov [57,59]. Alternative pri-
vacy metrics resort to combinatorial approaches that count
correspondences between senders and receivers consistent
with observed message timings, ruling out some of the
permutations [29].
It is relatively straightforward to conceptually formulate
alternative anonymity models, but mathematical and com-
putational implications may just as easily become overly
complex. As an example suggestive of a measure of ano-
nymity different from the one preferred in this work, sup-
pose that the anonymity of the communications between
3 senders and 2 receivers is to be protected by means of a
threshold pool mix. Suppose further that the privacy adver-
sary is interested in unveiling communication patterns rep-
resentable by the 3-by-2 matrix of conditional probabilities
modeling the transmission frequency of any given sender-
receiver pair. From the observation of the message timing
and knowing the operation parameters of the pool mix, pri-
vacy could be measured as the error in the estimation of
said matrix, for instance as the Frobenius norm between
the estimate and the correctmatrix. Themathematical trac-
tability of this model, however, is no trivial matter.
An enthralling approach to assessing the anonymity of a
threshold pool mix, completely different in its fundamen-
tal model from the one followed here, appears in [77].
While this is a perfectly sound, mathematically tractable
model, rather than measuring the uncertainty in the corre-
spondence between input and output messages, or even
sender and receiver identity, the privacy model in the cited
work focuses on sender and receiver linkability. In their
example on simple Chaumian mixes (Section 4), 3 senders
and 3 receivers communicate via a single pool mix with
threshold 2. Attacker observations are defined as pairs con-
sisting of a subset of senders and a subset of receivers con-
sistent with the anonymized communication. Say sender 2
sends a message to receiver 1, and 3 to 2. The only possible
observation is that indicating that senders 2 and 3 and
receivers 1 and 2 are involved; all other observations given
this anonymous event are assigned zero probability.
Although there is only one possible observation per anon-
ymous communication and thus the conditional probabili-
ties of observations given anonymous events are trivial,
there are several equally likely anonymous events explain-
ing each observation, among all possible anonymous
events a priori. The conditional probabilities of all the
anonymous events contemplated given all candidate
observations are then used in the computation of a number
of metrics, including the Shannon conditional entropy,
additively normalized in the form of mutual information,
and the conditional min-entropy described in [64].
4. Theoretical characterization of the anonymity-delay
trade-off
In the previous section, we specified the design param-
eters of threshold pool mixes and established measures of
delay incurred and of anonymity gained. In this section,
equipped with quantifiable design variables and objec-
tives, we may proceed to tackle the problem of selection
of mix parameters to attain an optimal anonymity-delay
trade-off, in the sense that anonymity is maximized for a
given expected delay, or expected delay is minimized for
a given anonymity. For that purpose, we first express
expected delay and anonymity as functions of the mix
parameters, then show which choice of parameters is opti-
mal, and finally characterize the optimal performance
attained. We make use of well-known properties of geo-
metric r.v.’s, reviewed in the background subsection, Sec-
tion 3.2. All theoretical results are expressed to be valid
for any logarithmic base.
4.1. Delay in messages and time units
The parameters k; m and n and the details of the oper-
ation of threshold pool mixes were specified in the previ-
ous section, Section 3.4. In the same section, the delay in
number of messages D was defined and shown to be indic-
ative of delay in time units, as far as averages are con-
cerned, up to a proportionality constant. But D was also
shown to be indicative of anonymity, as it indexes the cor-
respondence between input and output messages.
Finally, we broke down D into two characteristic compo-
nents, the batch B a message is flushed in and the index I
within the batch. This notation was illustrated in the
example shown in Fig. 3, for a mix with k ¼ 2; n ¼ 5 and
m ¼ 3.
Our first proposition will complete the characterization
of D by analyzing the statistical properties of B and I. The
proposition in question will contemplate the extreme
case of a Chaumian mix, in which the buffer is completely
flushed in every round, represented by m ¼ 0, or
equivalently, k ¼ n. Further, we shall also see that the
proposition is consistent with the complete absence of a
mix, modeled by k ¼ 1 ¼ n and yielding D ¼ 0 with
probability 1.
Proposition 1 (Batch, Index and Delay in Messages).
(i) B has a geometric distribution, supported on the set
f0;1; . . .g, with parameter k=n.
(ii) I is uniformly distributed on f0;1; . . . ; k$ 1g.
(iii) B and I are statistically independent.
(iv) Furthermore, the PMF of D is
pDðdÞ ¼
1
n
1$ k
n
% & d
kb c
¼ 1
n
m
n
' ( d
kb c
:
(v) Finally, in the trivial case when m ¼ 0, we have B ¼ 0
with probability 1, thus D ¼ I, uniformly distributed
on f0;1; . . . ;n$ 1g.
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Proof. The probability of a specific message being chosen
from a pool of n, after k independent trials without
replacement, is k=n. If this particular message is not chosen
in a batch of size k, it may be chosen in the next
independently, and with the same likelihood. The position
of this message within the batch, by symmetry, is equally
likely, regardless of the batch number. The expression for
pD is a straightforward consequence of the relationship
between D and ðB; IÞ, and involves routine manipulation of
the formula for the PMF of the geometric r.v. B. h
Fig. 4 plots the PMF pDðdÞ characterized in Proposition
1(iv). The depiction illustrates the general case when
k < n, for which the distribution decays geometrically in
steps of size k, and has unbounded support. In the special
case of the Chaumian mix, when k ¼ n, the expression in
the proposition reduces to a uniform distribution between
0 and n$ 1. As intuition would suggest, pDðdÞ reaches its
maximum value 1=n at d ¼ 0, regardless of k.
The next proposition characterizes the PDF pDðdÞ of the
delay in time units D, in terms of the PMF pDðdÞ of the delay
in number of messages D.
Proposition 2 (Delay in Time Units). Assume that message
arrivals follow a Poisson process with rate k ¼ 1=!t.
(i) The PDF pDðdÞ of the delay in time units D is a mixture
of a Dirac delta dDiracðdÞ at d ¼ 0, with weight equal to
PfD ¼ 0g ¼ 1=n, and of Erlang r.v.’s weighted accord-
ing to the PMF pDðdÞ of the delay in number of mes-
sages D, given by
pDðdÞ ¼
1
n
dDiracðdÞ þ k e$k d
X1
d¼0
pDðdþ 1Þ
ðk dÞd
d!
:
(ii) In the special case when k ¼ 1; pDðdÞ becomes a simple
mixture of a Dirac delta at d ¼ 0 and an exponential
r.v. with parameter k=n; more specifically,
pDðdÞ ¼
1
n
dDiracðdÞ þ 1$ 1n
% &
k
n
e$
k
n d:
Proof. We showed in Proposition 1 that pDð0Þ ¼ 1=n. Let
pDjDðdjdÞ denote the conditional PDF of D given D. From
the definition of D as the sum of D interarrival terms,
pDjDðdj0Þ ¼ dDiracðdÞ, and
pDðdÞ ¼ EDpDjDðdjDÞ ¼
1
n
dDiracðdÞ þ
X1
d¼1
pDðdÞ pDjDðdjdÞ:
Under the Poisson assumption, for any d > 0;D given d
is the sum of d independent, exponentially distributed
r.v.’s with common parameter k, i.e., Djd has an Erlang dis-
tribution, precisely,
pDjDðdjdÞ ¼
kd dd$1
ðd$ 1Þ! e
$kd:
The first statement of the proposition follows.
The secondassertion involves particularizing Proposition1
for k ¼ 1, which implies that D ¼ B is geometrically distrib-
uted with parameter 1=n, starting at 0, which in turn
particularizes pDjDðdjdÞ above for
pDðdÞ ¼
1
n
1$ 1
n
% &d
;
resulting in
pDjDðdjdÞ ¼ 1$
1
n
% &
k
n
e$kd
X1
d¼0
1$ 1n
" #
k d
" #d
d!
:
To complete the proof, recall that ex ¼P1n¼0 xnn!. h
4.2. Expected delay and entropies
We are now ready to express the expected delay in
number of messages (2), and the Shannon and min- entro-
pies, in terms of the mix parameters.
Proposition 3 (Delay Expectation and Variance).
!d ¼ lD ¼ ED ¼ mþ
k$ 1
2
¼ n$ kþ 1
2
and
r2D ¼ Var D ¼ m nþ
k2 $ 1
12
:
Proof. Proposition 1 asserts that B and I are geometric and
uniform r.v.’s, respectively. Direct application of the well-
known expressions for the mean and variance of said
r.v.’s leads to E B ¼ nk $ 1; E I ¼ k$12 ; Var B ¼ m nk2 and
Var I ¼ k2$112 . The linearity of the expectation operator
applied to (3) implies that ED ¼ kE Bþ E I. On the other
hand, because B and I are independent, they are also uncor-
related; consequently, Var D ¼ k2 Var Bþ Var I. h
Conformingwith intuition, !d ¼ 0 if, andonly if, there is no
mix, or equivalently, k ¼ 1 andm ¼ 0.Wementioned earlier
that the Hartley entropy H0ðDÞ of Dwas not a suitable mea-
sure of anonymity. It is now clear, particularly from the
expression for the PMF pDðdÞ in Proposition 1(iv) and its
depiction in Fig. 4, that as long as k < n, regardless of the
specific values of k and n; H0ðDÞ remains uninformatively
infinite. The following proposition and the rest of this paper
Fig. 4. PMF pDðdÞ ¼ PfD ¼ dg of the delay D in number of messages,
according to Proposition 1(iv).
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concordantly focuses mainly on Shannon’s entropy H1ðDÞ
and min-entropy H1ðDÞ. We shall see, however, that
collision entropy and Rényi’s entropy will also appear occa-
sionally in our analysis.While Shannon’s entropy somewhat
captures the shape of the PMF in its entirety, the min-
entropy merely exploits the fact that a MAP anonymity
adversary would guess D ¼ 0 (or D ¼ 1; . . . ;D ¼ k$ 1) as a
maximally likely outcome, as represented in Fig. 3. We
would like to stress that in the case m ¼ 0, equivalent to
require that k ¼ n; D becomes uniformly distributed and
consequently all entropies attain the (unconstrained) max-
imum HaðDÞ ¼ logn. In the first statement of the following
proposition,m ¼ 0 is correctly represented under the usual
convention 0 log 0 ¼ 0, mentioned in Section 3.2.
Before proceeding, we must hasten to acknowledge that
one of the results in Proposition4, namely the expression for
the Shannon entropy (i), already appeared in [58,57],
although its complete derivation is available in [14]. The
proof developed here, however, is substantially more com-
pact. Further, these references do not considermin-entropy,
the anonymity-delay trade-off, nor the optimality of themix
parameters to attain it, central aspects in this paper.
Proposition 4 (Entropy).
(i) H1ðDÞ ¼ H1ðk=nÞk=n þ log k ¼ ðn log n$m log mÞ=k,
(ii) H1ðDÞ ¼ log n, and
(iii) H2ðDÞ ¼ log ðmþ nÞ.
(iv) More generally, for any 0 < a – 1,
HaðDÞ ¼ 11$ a log
k
na $ma :
Proof. Assertion (i) concerning the Shannon entropy is a
consequence of Proposition 1, characterizing D in terms of
the pair ðB; IÞ. Indeed, the one-to-one correspondence
observed in Section 4.1 and the statistical independence
shown in the proposition in that subsection enable us to
writeH1ðDÞ ¼ H1ðB; IÞ ¼ H1ðBÞ þ H1ðIÞ. Since B is geometric,
H1ðBÞ ¼ H1ðk=nÞk=n ¼ $ logðk=nÞ $
1$ k=n
k=n
logð1$ k=nÞ
¼ $ log k
n
$m
k
log
m
n
;
and since I is uniform, H1ðIÞ ¼ log k. The simplified expres-
sion for H1ðDÞ in the current proposition follows from rou-
tine logarithmic manipulation.
Part (ii) of the proposition is an immediate consequence
of the definition of min-entropy and the PMF of D, the
latter expressed in Proposition 1(iv).
The proof of statement (iii) on the collision entropy
follows immediately from the general statement on Rényi
entropies, which we proceed to show, simply by comput-
ing the summation in its definition. Specifically, on account
of Proposition 1(iv),X1
d¼1
pDðdÞa ¼ k
X1
b¼0
1
n
1$ k
n
% &b !a
¼ k
na
X1
b¼0
1$ k
n
% &a b
¼ k=n
a
1$ 1$ kn
" #a ¼ kna $ ðn$ kÞa :
As one may expect, statement (i) in the theoremmay alter-
natively be proven by taking the limit of (iv) as a
approaches 1, concretely using l’Hôpital’s rule. Conversely,
statement (iv) may also be shown in a manner entirely
analogous to that for (i). h
4.3. Optimal trade-off
Equipped with the previous propositions, we are finally
ready to solve the multiobjective optimization problem
that characterizes the optimal trade-off between expected
delay and anonymity in the design of threshold pool mixes.
As stated in the beginning of this section, by optimal mix
parameters we mean those parameters maximizing ano-
nymity for a given expected delay, or equivalently, mini-
mizing expected delay for a given anonymity.
It should be noted that Proposition 3 implies that only
two disjoint types of expected delay are possible, namely
integer and half-integer delays, and concordantly those
cases will be distinguished. Recall that the set of half-inte-
gers is the set Zþ 1=2. More precisely, said proposition
indicates that k being odd is equivalent to !d being an inte-
ger, and k being even, to !d being a half-integer.
The following theorem, Theorem 5, finds the best ano-
nymity under a constraint on the expected delay, for the
two possible cases of the latter quantity, integer and
half-integer. We must stress that best here means highest
entropy for a given expected delay !d. Consider, for exam-
ple, !d ¼ 2. Proposition 3 implies that the only possible
mixes are those determined by ðk;nÞ equal to
ð1;3Þ; ð3;4Þ and ð5;5Þ, with odd k in all three cases. Our
theorem will demonstrate that the first, the only mix with
k ¼ 1, is the best choice in Shannon entropy, whereas the
last, determined by the condition k ¼ n, is optimal under
the alternative min-entropy criterion. Take now the con-
straint !d ¼ 3=2, encompassing the mixes parametrized by
ðk;nÞ equal to ð2;3Þ and ð4;4Þ, with even k in both cases.
While Shannon entropy favors the only choice with
k ¼ 2, namely ð2;3Þ, min-entropy advocates instead for
ð4;4Þ. For such half-integer-valued !d, no mix with k ¼ 1 is
possible, let alone optimal.
On account of (3) and Proposition 3, it is also important
to remark that the case k ¼ 1 corresponds to D ¼ B, which
means that the delay is geometrically distributed, precisely
the solution for the case of Shannon entropy with integer
expected delays.
Theorem 5 (Optimal Mix Parameters).
(i) For each integer expected delay !d, the mix has maxi-
mum Shannon entropy H1ðDÞ among all mixes with
that delay if, and only if, k ¼ 1. In the half-integer case,
maximum Shannon entropy is then equivalent to k ¼ 2.
(ii) Regardless of whether the expected delay is an integer
or a half-integer, a mix has maximum min-entropy
among all mixes with the same delay if, and only if,
k ¼ n.
(iii) Any mix parameters achieve maximum collision
entropy for some delay.
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Proof. The case of integer delays and Shannon entropy is
an immediate consequence of the fact that k ¼ 1 is equiv-
alent to requiring that D be geometrically distributed, and
the fact that geometric r.v.’s maximize the Shannon
entropy subject to a constraint on their expectation [11,
Section 12]. Consider now the half-integer case, which cor-
responds to the case of even k. Define B0 ¼ bD=2c and
I0 ¼ D mod 2. It should immediately be noted that B0 ¼ B,
and thus geometrically distributed, provided that k ¼ 2.
For any even k;D ¼ 2 B0 þ I0, and I0 ¼ I mod 2. This implies
that the uniformity and independence of the batch index I,
demonstrated in Proposition 1, carries over to the binary
r.v. I0. Therefore,
H1ðDÞ ¼ H1ðB0; I0Þ ¼ H1ðB0Þ þ H1ðI0Þ ¼ H1ðB0Þ þ log 2
and
ED ¼ 2EB0 þ EI0 ¼ 2EB0 þ 1=2:
This reduces the problem of maximizing H1ðDÞ for a fixed
ED to the problem of maximizing H1ðB0Þ for a fixed EB0,
maximum attained whenever B0 is geometrically distrib-
uted, i.e., whenever k ¼ 2.
As far as the optimality condition for the min-entropy
case is concerned, we proceed by seeking the minimum
expected delay !d for a fixed H1ðDÞ, invoking the results of
Propositions 3 and 4. Precisely, regarding these two
quantities as functions of k and n;H1ðDÞ ¼ logn depends
only on n, whereas !d decreases with k 6 n.
It is left to prove the optimality condition in the
collision entropy case. Propositions 3 and 4(iii) imply that
H2ðDÞ ¼ logð2!dþ 1Þ:
This means that once !d is fixed, H2ðDÞ is uniquely deter-
mined, in other words, any consistent combination of
mix parameters will produce a single collision entropy
value, formally both the maximum and the minimum for
a given expected delay. h
A numerical example should clarify the assertions in
Theorem 5, and illustrate the formulas in Propositions 3
and 4. A mix with buffer size n ¼ 3 and batch size k ¼ 1
imposes a delay !d ¼ 2 while offering a level of anonymity
quantified by a Shannon entropy of H1ðDÞ ’ 2:755 bit. No
other combination of mix parameters n and k with !d ¼ 2
– or lower – can attain higher H1ðDÞ. This includes the
combinations n ¼ 4 and k ¼ 3; n ¼ 5 and k ¼ 5, and so
on. Making n ¼ 3 and k ¼ 2 yields !d ¼ 1:5 and
H1ðDÞ ’ 2:377, the maximum Shannon entropy among
any mixes with that particular delay. The first entropy,
approximately 2.755, is indeed higher than the second,
2.377, but 2 is also a higher delay than 1.5. As a matter
of fact, both entropy-delay pairs define points lying on
the optimal trade-off curve. None is better than the other
in the sense of multiobjective optimization, that is, when
anonymity is maximized for a given delay, or delay mini-
mized for a given anonymity.
If anonymity is to be measured by min-entropy, then
k ¼ n produces the best anonymity-delay trade-off. For
n ¼ 5 ¼ k; !d ¼ 2 and H1ðDÞ ’ 2:322, meaning that no
other mix satisfying that delay constraint can offer better
anonymity, when measured as min-entropy. For
n ¼ 6 ¼ k; !d ¼ 2:5 and H1ðDÞ ’ 2:585; anonymity is
improved at the cost of delay. A more detailed numerical
illustration is presented later in Section 5.
Our next and last theorem provides explicit closed-form
expressions for the optimal anonymity-delay trade-off.
Denote by H1ð!dÞ the values of the function H1 : !d# H1ðDÞ,
and analogously for H1ð!dÞ. Once again, recall that
0 log 0 ¼ 0. The last note on decreasing increments, which
may be regarded as a form of discrete concavity, means
that, in practice, increasing delay yields diminishing
returns in anonymity.
Theorem 6 (Optimal Anonymity-Delay Trade-Off).
(i) In the Shannon entropy case, the optimal trade-off
between anonymity H1ðDÞ and expected delay !d is
attained at the points in the plane related by
H1ð!dÞ ¼ ð!dþ 1ÞH1 1!dþ 1
% &
¼ ð!dþ 1Þ log ð!dþ 1Þ $ !d log !d
for !d ¼ 0;1; . . ., and
H1ð!dÞ¼
!dþ3=2
2
H1
2
!dþ3=2
% &
þ log 2
¼1
2
ð!dþ3=2Þ log ð!dþ3=2Þ"
$ð!d$1=2Þ log ð!d$1=2Þ#
for !d ¼ 1=2;3=2; . . . In addition, in the latter case,
H1ð!dÞ ¼ 12 H1ð
!d$ 1=2Þ þ H1ð!dþ 1=2Þ
" #
:
(ii) In the min-entropy case, the optimality curve is given
by H1ð!dÞ ¼ log ð2!dþ 1Þ.
(iii) The above expressions may be approximated for !d ) 1,
by H1ð!dÞ ’ log !dþ log e (regardless of whether !d is an
integer or a half-integer), and
(iv) H1ð!dÞ ’ log !dþ log 2.
(v) Both entropies, as a function of the expected delay, are
unbounded and strictly increasing. However, the inte-
ger increment functions H1ð!dþ 1Þ $ H1ð!dÞ and
H1ð!dþ 1Þ $ H1ð!dÞ are strictly decreasing.
(vi) Similarly to the min-entropy case, in the collision
entropy case, H2ð!dÞ ¼ log ð2!dþ 1Þ, and
(vii) H2ð!dÞ ’ log !dþ log 2.
Proof. The exact formulas (i) and (ii) are routine manipu-
lation of the results in Propositions 3 and 4, restricted to
the optimal values of k in Theorem 5.
The only nontrivial approximation is (iii), for the Shan-
non entropy case, which we show for the integer delay
subcase, as the half-integer one is entirely analogous. Write
ð!dþ 1Þ logð!dþ 1Þ $ !d log !d ¼ logð!dþ 1Þ þ !d log
!dþ 1
!d
:
In order to complete the proof of this statement, it suffices
to show that the last term approaches log e as !d!1, or
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more simply in terms of natural logarithms, that it
approaches 1. To see this, define t ¼ 1=!d and compute the
limit as t ! 0, using l’Hôpital’s rule:
lim
!d!1
!d ln
!dþ 1
!d
¼ lim
t!0
lnð1þ tÞ
t
¼ lim
t!0
1=ð1þ tÞ
1
¼ 1:
The statements in (v) for H1ð!dÞ are similar albeit simpler to
prove than those for H1ð!dÞ, and hence omitted. The claim
that H1ð!dÞ is unbounded may be seen from the logarithmic
approximation (iii) to (i). To show that it is strictly increas-
ing, we differentiate the first expression for integer !d, in
terms of natural logarithms without loss of generality,
and verify that it is strictly positive:
dH1
d!d
¼ lnð!dþ 1Þ $ ln !d > 0:
In light of the interpolation formula in (i), this also proves
the half-integer case.
The statement regarding decreasing increments may be
shown in a number of ways. A direct method for the
integer case consists computing the derivative
d
d!d
ðH1ð!dþ 1Þ $ H1ð!dÞÞ ¼ dH1d!d ð
!dþ 1Þ $ dH1
d!d
ð!dÞ
¼ lnð!dþ 2Þ þ lnð!dÞ $ 2 lnð!dþ 1Þ;
easily verified to be strictly negative from the concavity of
the logarithm and Jensen’s inequality. For the half-integer
case, the interpolation (i) implies that
H1ð!dþ 1Þ $ H1ð!dÞ ¼ 12 ðH1ð
!dþ 3=2Þ $ H1ð!dþ 1=2Þ þ H1ð!d
þ 1=2Þ $ H1ð!d$ 1=2ÞÞ;
the sum of two integer increments at the integer values
!dþ 12 and !d$ 1=2, just shown to be decreasing.
Alternative methods involve verifying that the second
derivative of H1ð!dÞ is negative, which means that the first
derivative is decreasing and that the function itself is
concave, then applying the mean-value theorem, the
fundamental theorem of calculus, or Jensen’s.
Finally, the exact formula in statement (vi) concerning
collision entropy was in fact shown and used at the end of
the proof of Theorem 5, and being equal to that for min-
entropy, so is approximation (vii). h
4.4. Brief digression regarding sender correlation in message
bursts
Our general approach, particularly with regard to the
measurement of anonymity, focuses on the linkability
between incoming and outgoing messages. By proposing
a single scalar quantity, namely the entropy of a r.v. index-
ing message correspondence, be it min-entropy or Shan-
non’s entropy, we are able to optimize it directly. Of
course, more complex mathematical objects may be
employed to characterize the private information to be
protected. A prime example would be a matrix of probabil-
ities of a given sender communicating with a given
receiver, among all possible combinations, not unlike the
transition matrix of a Markov model. We stress that
the necessarily limited scope of this paper deals with the
former, a message-based approach, rather than the latter,
focused on sender-receiver linkability. An exciting, future
research avenue may stem from the application of the opti-
mization ideas presented in this work to additional privacy
models.
Still, we would like to make a quick digression on the
connection between the linkability of incoming and outgo-
ing messages, on the one hand, and senders and receivers,
on the other, in the particularly delicate case when consec-
utive messages belong to the same user. Informally speak-
ing, in certain situations the mix may operate with large
populations of senders and receivers, frequently generat-
ing messages in such a manner that bursts of consecutive
messages with a common sender or a common receiver
arriving at the mix are unlikely. Under these circum-
stances, the distribution of input messages for a given out-
put message, and the distribution of output messages for a
given input message, should be faithful representations of
the uncertainty of senders of a message addressed to a
given receiver, and that of receivers of a message written
by a given sender. Concordantly, in the case depicted, our
metrics of message unlinkability rightfully constitute met-
rics of anonymity.
However, under different circumstances it may be the
case that consecutive messages from the same sender to
a common receiver arrive at the mix with nonnegligible
frequency, due to communication habits of the parties
involved, under low traffic from other parties, or perhaps
because a large message ends up being split into several
portions manageable by the network. Additionally, consec-
utive messages from a common sender to several receivers
may implement multicast notifications. Under circum-
stances conducive to such message bursts, even if occa-
sionally interlaced with other messages, our measure of
message linkability may not adequately reflect, as is, the
difficulty to link senders and receivers.
It appears that in principle, message bursts with a com-
mon sender could easily be recognized by the mix on the
basis of the identity of the sender and the proximity of arri-
val times, and be simply treated as a single virtual message
for all intends and purposes of delaying and reordering
implemented by the mix, at a small expense of additional
delay. Unfortunately, such bursts would be easily detect-
able at the output of the mix. Moreover, recall that mixes
resort not only to delay, but also to padding to counter
message linkability via traffic analysis based on the com-
parison of packet sizes. The alternative of attempting to
merge burst messages at the network level might be highly
inefficient, not only in terms of network transmission, but
also in terms of prohibitive padding requirements.
We have argued that in this paper we measure message
unlinkability as indicative of anonymity under the implicit
assumption of unfrequent bursts. While we acknowledge
the interest of a thorough analysis of the degradation in
message unlinkability due to message bursts, because of
the intended scope of our work, this is left for future inves-
tigation. For instance, and merely in principle, this might
be accomplished by analyzing the reduction of uncertainty
in the assignment of a given output message to input mes-
sages, when some of the input messages belong to the
same sender and might be thus construed as a single
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virtual message for the purposes of the computation of
entropy. As the corresponding message indexing would
be a noninjective version of our indexing variable D with
merged probabilities, the resulting entropy HðDÞ would,
in general, decrease.
5. Experimental results
This section numerically illustrates the main theoretical
results of Section 4, obtained for threshold pool mixes
operating according to the model and the parameters spec-
ified in Section 3.4. Recall from the latter section that the
r.v. D represents the delay from the moment a message
enters the mix until it is forwarded, measured in terms of
number of messages. The expected delay !d in number of
messages (2) is a measure proportional to the expected
delay in time units, where the proportionality constant is
the expected interarrival time (the inverse of the rate of
message arrivals per time unit). We also argued that the
delay D also indexes the correspondence between input
and output messages, and that anonymity is measured as
either the Shannon entropy H1ðDÞ or the min-entropy
H1ðDÞ, information-theoretic measures briefly reviewed
in Section 3.2. All results are plotted in terms of those
quantities; all entropies are given in bits.
First, we experimentally verify the formula of the PMF
pDðdÞ of the delay in number of messages D in Proposition
1(iv). To that end, we simulate a threshold mix with batch
size k ¼ 2 and buffer size n ¼ 5, keeping track of the delay
Fig. 5. Experimental verification of the formula of the PMF pDðdÞ of the
delay D in number of messages in Proposition 1(iv). The simulation
employed a threshold mix with batch size k ¼ 2 and buffer size n ¼ 5, and
kept track of the delay D of a total of 105 messages.
Fig. 6. Experimental verification of the formula of the PDF pDðdÞ of the
delay D in time units in Proposition 2(i). The simulation employed a
threshold mix with batch size k ¼ 2 and buffer size n ¼ 5, and kept track
of the delay D of a total of 105 messages. Messages were generated
according to a Poisson process, simply by drawing independent, expo-
nentially distributed interarrival times, with mean !t ¼ 2.
Fig. 7. Anonymity-delay region of all possible threshold pool mixes with !d 2 ½0;100&. The optimal and worst frontiers are highlighted.
Fig. 8. Anonymity-delay trade-off for each entropy criterion.
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D of a total of 105 messages. The theoretical and experi-
mental distributions are depicted in Fig. 5. According to
Proposition 3, the mean and variance of the delay are
!d ¼ 3:5 and Var D ¼ 15:25, which our simulation esti-
mated at 3.4999 and 15.272, respectively.
In the same simulation with k ¼ 2 and n ¼ 5, Poisson
message arrivals are modeled simply by generating inde-
pendent, exponentially distributed interarrival times, with
a common mean !t ¼ 2 (arrival rate k ¼ 1=!t ¼ 1=2). In order
to verify the formula of the PDF pDðdÞ of the delay in time
units D in Proposition 2(i), we estimate the weight of the
Dirac delta component by counting the relative occurrence
of the event fD ¼ 0g, and we approximate the continuous
portion with a simple Gaussian-kernel PDF estimate on
the samples with D > 0. The resulting PDF estimate is plot-
ted in Fig. 6, along with the theoretical counterpart. Addi-
tionally, we confirm the theoretical values for the
expectation and variance of the delay in time units,
lD ¼ 7 and r2D ¼ 75, in Proposition 0, which the simulation
accurately estimates as 6.9907 and 74.970, respectively.
Secondly, we consider all mixes parameterized by k and
n with an expected delay !d between 0 and 100, and com-
pute their corresponding Shannon and min- entropies,
according to the dependence established in Propositions
3 and 4, which we plot in Fig. 7. Both integer and half-inte-
ger delays were included in the computation. The figure
highlights, and numerically confirms, the optimal trade-
off characterized in Theorems 5 and 6, that is, the frontier
of maximum anonymity for a given expected delay, or
minimum expected delay for a given anonymity, corre-
sponding to k ¼ 1;2 in the Shannon entropy case, and
k ¼ n in the min-entropy case. The figure equally high-
lights the effect of measuring anonymity according to
one criterion or type of entropy, but optimizing for the
other. Remarkably enough, our numerical computations
suggest that optimizing for the wrong criterion yields the
worst entropy for a given delay, not merely a suboptimal
entropy.
Next, the two trade-offs are compared in a single plot
provided as Fig. 8, which is numerically consistent with
the exact formulae and the approximations found in
Theorem 6. Incidentally, we observed the approximations
to be fairly accurate, and hardly distinguishable from the
exact values in a plot, even for small !d.
Lastly, Fig. 9 plots the relative loss ð!d$ !dminÞ=!dmin with
respect to the optimal expected delay !dmin, for a given
entropy, for each of the mixes considered in Fig. 7. In the
Shannon case, for each entropy value, the reference delay
!dmin was interpolated from the first optimal trade-off for-
mula in Theorem 6. Observe that in the min-entropy case,
a relative delay increment of up to 100% may be incurred
by choosing the wrong mix parameters, and values of
around 40% are common for the worst choice in the Shan-
non case. The upshot is that these two types of entropy
constitute anonymity criteria leading to effectively differ-
ent optimal parameters and mix performance.
6. Conclusion
This work addresses the problem of designing threshold
pool mixes, a key building block in the area of anonymous
communications, in a manner that contemplates the opti-
mal trade-off between the two contrasting aspects of ano-
nymity and delay.
We approach the issue of practical design of mixes in a
systematic fashion, drawing upon the methodology of mul-
tiobjective optimization, long established in scientific
fields such as data compression or economics, but perhaps
less so in the area of information privacy. More precisely,
we consider a standard global passive adversary model
and adopt several quantifiable measures of anonymity in
the literature, Hartley’s entropy, Shannon’s entropy, min-
entropy, and collision entropy. A succinct review and inter-
pretation of those types of entropies is provided in
Section 3.2. For any message arrival process under the mild
assumption of a common average in the sequence of inter-
arrival times, we adopt a quantifiable measure of cost
incurred, average delay. Having established a quantitative
model of our design objectives enables us to formulate
the issue of mix design as an optimization problem. The
optimal solution to this problem is not a point, but a curve
Fig. 9. Relative loss in expected delay incurred by suboptimal choices of mix parameters.
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in the anonymity-delay plane representing the trade-off
we seek.
Our extensive theoretical analysis expresses our opti-
mization objectives, namely the expected delay !d and
entropies H1ðDÞ; H1ðDÞ, and H2ðDÞ, in terms of the mix
parameters, batch size k and buffer size n. The theory con-
tinues by establishing the optimal parameters for each
entropy criterion, along with exact and approximate
expressions for the optimal anonymity-delay curve, the
latter of the form HðDÞ ’ log !dþ c, with c a constant
depending on the type of entropy. We also show that incre-
ments in expected delay yield positive albeit diminishing
returns in anonymity.
A question that arises naturally from the conventional
operation of threshold pool mixes, in the context of ano-
nymity-delay optimality, is whether forwarded messages
should be drawn uniformly from the pool’s buffer. In other
words, one may contemplate the possibility of a nonuni-
formly distributed choice, still random, but somehow
biased towards messages that have remained inside the
pool longer than others. The proof of the optimality results
reached in Theorem 5 in the Shannon entropy case is based
on the fact that geometric distributions, generated by inde-
pendent Bernoulli trials and obtained for k ¼ 1, maximize
entropy subject to a constraint on expectation. The proof
in question leads to the remarkable conclusion that uni-
form choices are optimal. However, this statement hinges
on the measurement of cost as an average delay, instead
of, say, a second-order moment, and on the measurement
of anonymity as a Shannon entropy.
As for the case of min-entropy, only the highest likeli-
hood of the message index correspondence D matters,
which is 1=n, attained in particular when D ¼ 0 regardless
of k. In this case, the optimality condition k ¼ n, equivalent
to m ¼ 0, means that the batch of k messages is forwarded
as soon as possible, in order to minimize the delay. In other
words, simple Chaumian mixes, with m ¼ 0, are optimal
threshold pool mixes when anonymity is measured as a
min-entropy and cost as an average delay.
Somewhat surprisingly, any combination of mix param-
eters attains optimality in collision entropy for some delay,
which means that the anonymity-delay region in this spe-
cial case collapses into a curve.
Our main theoretical results, particularly the anonym-
ity-delay region of possible mixes and the exact and
approximate characterizations of its optimal frontier, are
confirmed numerically. Our experiments report substantial
delay reductions by optimizing the mix parameters. In par-
ticular, we observe that a poor parametrization may lead to
unnecessary average delay increments of up to 100% in the
min-entropy case, and of up to 40% in the Shannon case.
The experiments also delve into the effects of measuring
anonymity according to one criterion, but optimizing
according to the other, and conclude that these two types
of entropy constitute anonymity criteria leading to effec-
tively different optimal parameters and mix performance.
In closing, we would like to stress that our contribution
on the design of threshold pool mixes may be regarded not
only as a step towards a practical design that takes into
account the factors of privacy and usability, but also
as a methodological illustration of the applicability of
formalized multiobjective optimization techniques to the
still emerging field of privacy in information systems.
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